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Recently many distinguished commentators have expressed the need for a
formal and written constitution in the United Kingdom. 1 The intention of this
article is not to discuss the requirement of such a constitution, but rather to offer
a general outline of the development of the Israeli constitution. However, the
British lawyer might find the Israeli model useful as a stimulant of new ideas for
constitutional reform.
In reading this article, several questions should be kept in mind. The first is the
frequently discussed issue of whether there is a need for a written constitution.2
The second part of the article, which discusses the establishment of the State of
Israel, its Declaration of Independence and the decision to adopt a piecemeal
constitution, might suggest that the answer to this question is not necessarily in
the affirmative.
Secondly, if one is advocating a written constitution for the U.K., one should
ask how such constitution should be introduced to a state with a long-standing
tradition of a non-written constitution. To this the third part, which portrays the
birth of the Israeli Constitution, i.e. the enactment of the various Basic Laws, is
relevant.
Finally, one should be aware of the role that political interests, on the one
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hand, and judicial activism on the other, play in the formation of a written
constitution. These will become apparent in the fourth part where two recent
Basic Laws which directly concern fundamental rights are discussed.
As background the first part of the article outlines the legal sources of Israeli
law which date back to the period before the establishment of the State of Israel.
I. Before the Establishment of the State ofisrae11517-1948
Palestine was under Ottoman rule from 1517 until the end of the First World
War. It was conquered by the British troops in 1917, and was granted to England
in 1922 by the League of Nations as a Mandatory Territory for the purpose of
establishing "a national home for the Jewish People." Thus, thirty years of
British mandate over Palestine began.3
The British administration found the Ottoman law, under which Palestine was
governed difficult to apply to modem legal problems. This lead to a steady
process of modification of the Ottoman legal system during the period of the
British mandate. The modification of the Ottoman legal system was conducted
by the British in various forms.
The first was by introducing statutes based upon Westrninister legislation 4 or
by issuing ordinances which gave statutory form to existing British common law
principles. The second was by virtue of Article 46 of an Order-in-Council from
1922.5 In case of a lacuna in the local laws, this Article provided that the
mandate administration would apply the British common law rules and the
doctrines of equity which were in force at that time in England. As the vast
majority of the judiciary in Palestine was British, Article 46 was given a wide
interpretation in order to give English Law a greater foothold within the laws of
Palestine. At the end of the mandate period, in 1948, Palestinian law had become
dominated by English law, with only residual elements of Ottoman principles.6
3 D.Friedman, "The Infusion of Common Law into the State of Israel" (1975) 10
Israel.L.Rev. 324.
4 Eg. the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the Companies Act 1929.
5 Palestine Order in Council, 10th.August, 1922.
6 D.Friedmann, "The Effect of Foreign Law on the Law of Israel: Remnants of the
Ottoman Period" (1975) 10 Israel.L.Rev. 192.
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II. Between the Establishment of the State of Israel and the Enactment of
the First Chapter of the Constitution 1948-1958
From the very first day of the existence of the state of Israel it was obvious that
the new state would follow many other modem western states in having a formal
constitution. The requirement for a formal constitution and for the establishment
of a Constituent Assembly are clearly stated in the Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israe1.?
The role of the executive was to be performed by a Provisional Council and
the task of adopting a constitution was to be performed by the Constituent
Assembly. The co-existence of the Provisional Council and the Constituent
Assembly was terminated by the Constituent Assembly (transition) Ordinance.8
Thus, the task of adopting a formal constitution was to be performed by a
constitutional body which consisted of both a Constituent Assembly and a House
of Representatives. That body later transformed into the first Knesset (the Israeli
Parliament).
On its first anniversary a debate was held in the Knesset on the issue of
whether or not a written constitution should be adopted. 9 For the purpose of this
discussion a description of the political parties which participated in that debate
is irrelevant, as are the parliamentary relations between these parties. Arguments
for and against a written constitution were generally similar to those often made
7 1948 1 L.S.I. 4 (1948): "We declare that with effect from the moment of the termination
of the [British] Mandate, being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th.ofIyar, 5708 [15th.May,
1948], until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with
the constitution which shall be adopted by the elected Constituent Assembly not later than
1st.October, 1948, the people's Council shall act as Provisional Council of State, and its
executive organ, the people's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish
State, to be called the State ofIsrael" (emphasis added).
R 19492 L.S.I. 81 (1948/49) s.3: "The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it does not
itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional Council of State."
Also see s.l: "The Provisional Council of State shall continue in office until the convening of the
Constituent Assembly of the State ofIsrael; upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly,
the Provisional Council of State shall dissolve and cease to exist."
9 Divrei Ha-Knesset [the Israeli equivalent of the British Hansard] (1950) voI.IV, 714 (in
Hebrew). For a summary of that debate in English see, Emanuel Rackman, Israel's Emerging
Constitution (Columbia University Press, New York, 1955) at llO-i 17.
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with regard to a British Constitution. to
However, some of the arguments which were particular to Israel are
noteworthy. Such arguments which supported a written constitution were: first,
that both The Declaration of the Establishment of the State ofIsrael II and the
United Nations General Assembly resolution 12 called for a written constitution.
Secondly, a constitution would have an important educational value. This was
thought to be of special significance due to the flood of Jewish immigrants from
different socio-Iegal backgrounds. 13 Thirdly, a written constitution would
embody declarations of fundamental freedoms, thus contributing to the
democratic values of the new State.14
These arguments seem to rely upon the particular political and socio-economic
situation of the new state. Ironically, those opposing a written constitution relied
upon the very same political and socio-economic circumstances: first, to create
rigid and unchangeable laws, without first testing their application, could lead to
disastrous results. 15 Secondly, it would be useless to create a written constitution
at this point in the history of the Jewish state. Only after the historic process had
taken place could the constitutional form of the State be included within a
written constitution. 16 Thirdly, even the drafting of the constitution would lead to
a severe dispute within the people as to what the constitution should include.
This dispute existed, and still exists today, between the religious parties who
oppose a written constitution, and the secular parties, the majority of which
favour a written constitution. 17 Fourthly, the constitution should be adopted only
]0 See e.g. Antoine Clarke, "The Case for a Written Constitution: Even Broken or Bad
Promises are Better in Writing" Liberation Alliance No.4 (1996), & Lord Browne-Wilkinson,
supra.n.2.
11 Supra.n.6.
12 G.A.Res.133 U.N.Doc.N519 at 131-50 (1947). This Resolution dealt with the partition
of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State. Both projected States were to have a formal
constitution.
13 Divrei Ha-Knesset (1950) voLIV 734.
14 Ibid. at 736, 737, 745 & 824.
15 Ibid. at 727.
16 Ibid. at 732.
17 Ibid. at 812.
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after the majority of the Jewish people gathered in the new State. Any other
course of action would lead to a constitution which would reflect the will of a
minority of the people. IS
Towards the end of the debate, two resolutions were proposed as possible
settlements of the dispute. The first was called the resolution of the 37 (Members
ofK.nesset); the second was called the Harrari resolution since it was proposed
by Mr.Yizhar Harrari M.K. (Member of Knesset). 19 Due to political and
paramilitary reasons the Harrari resolution was adopted by the Knesset. Thus,
the Israeli constitution was to be formed in a piecemeal manner, each chapter of
the piecemeal constitution to be called a Basic Law. However, the constitutional
status of these Basic Laws was not clear from the wording of the Harrari
resolution, and it remained to be seen what status would be given to them.
The first Basic Law to be passed was Basic Law: The Knesset 20 in 1958.21 The
period of eight years between the Harrari Resolution and the passing of Basic
Law: The Knesset, created a constitutional vacuum. It was clear from the Harrari
resolution that some chapters of the Israeli constitution should be made. In the
absence of such laws the Israeli judicial system referred to other constitutional
sources, such as the Declaration of the Establishment of the State ofIsrael.
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State ofIsrael states that:
"It will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the
prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and
18 Ibid. at 819.
19 Divrei Ha-Knesset (1950) vol.V, 1743 (in Hebrew). The first proposition read: "The
Knesset decides to charge the Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Committee with the
preparation of the State constitution, and to present it to the first Knesset. The Knesset will decide
upon the dates of the termination of the committee's wor'" [emphasis added]. The second
proposition read: "The first Knesset charges the Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial
Committee to prepare a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution shall be constructed
in chapters in such a way that each of them shall be a fundamental [sometimes referred to as
'Basic Laws'] law by itself. The chapters shall be brought before the Knesset as the committee
finishes its work on each, and all the chapters together shall then be combined into a constitution
for the State." From the different wording it is obvious that the latter, unlike the former, is an
indefinite postponement of the formation of a formal constitution. This is, most likely, the reason
that the latter was adopted, for it served the interests of those who opposed the constitution.
20 A colon is used to indicate that the words "Basic Laws" are not an integral part of the
name of the Act.
21195812 L.S.I. 85 (1958). See also Amendmentno.3 13 L.S.I 228 (1958).
67
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or
sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language,
education and culture ...'>22
In the landmark case of Ko! Ha 'am v.The Minister of Interior 23 the Minister of
Interior ordered the suspension of the publication of the newspaper of the
Communist party called 'Kol Ha'am (the English translation is 'the voice of the
people'). Under the Press (amendment) Ordinance 1936 24 section 19(2)(a), the
Minister of Interior had the right to do so if he was of the opinion that the
publishing of the newspaper was "likely to endanger the public peace ..." 25 The
newspaper sought a cancellation of the Minister's order, contending that it
impaired the freedom of expression and of the press. The result of the case
depended on the construction of the word 'likely' in section 19(2)(a). There were
two possible interpretations. The first is that 'likely' is to be construed as
meaning 'probable' thus giving the section a narrow scope of application. The
second is that 'likely' is to be construed as meaning 'bare tendency,' thus giving
the section a wider scope.
The Israeli Supreme Court preferred the former. In stating the ratio decidendi,
reference was made to the clause in the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel which was quoted above. Great importance was attached to the
clause as an interpretative tool as it had been stated to be an "aspiration of the
people and their basic credo." 26 This was the reason for the court's decision to
restrict as much as possible the interference of the executive with the principles
of freedom as they were set out in the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel.
Some commentators have referred to the decision in Ko! Ha 'am as creating a
"soft legal principle." 27 In the opinion of Professor D. Kretzmer 28 these
22 1948 1L.S.I. 4 (1948).
23 H.C. 73/53 (1953) 7 P.D.871.
24 The Palestine Gazette 1937 sup.I13.
25 Ibid
26 H.C.1O/48, Zee v. Gubernik (1948) 1P.D.85 at 89.
27 D.Kretzmer, "Demonstrations and the Law" (1984) 19 Israel L.Rev. 47 at 64.
28 Of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ibid
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principles are legal because in the absence of express statutory authority, the
executive is bound to act according to these principles. However, these
principles are 'soft' because they do not interfere with the doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament. The Knesset can at any time pass a statute which will
restrict these principles. Such a statute will not be subjected to judicial review
even if it will interfere with these legal principles.29
III. The Enactment of Basic Laws 1958-Present day
The next stage in the development of the Israeli constitution was the enactment
of Basic Laws of which some provisions are entrenched. Thus, for example,
sections 430 and 4431 of Basic Law: The Knesset are entrenched in various
degrees by requiring special majorities in the Knesset for any change of these
sections. It remained to be seen whether the courts would review subsequent
legislation in the light of the entrenched sections of the new Basic Law.
It took eleven years before the courts were confronted with the problem of
reviewing legislation subsequent to Basic Law: The Knesset. In 1969 Mr. A.
Bergman32 submitted a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice contending
that the fmancing law for the next elections 33 was contrary to section 4 of the
Basic Law: The Knesset.
The section read: "The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct,
equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset
Elections Law; this section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members
of the Knesset.,,34 Mr. Bergman contended that the new finance law was
disadvantageous to new lists running for the Knesset, since it allowed public
financial aid only to parties which were represented in the outgoing Knesset.
This contradicted the requirement that the elections shall be equal, as stated in
29 C.A. 450/70 Regozinsky v. State of Israel (1972) 26(1) P.D. 129.
30 1958 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958).
31 1958 12 L.S.I. 89 (1958).
32 B.C. 231/73 Aharon A.Bergman v. The Minister of Finance & Comptroller (1969)
23(1) P.D.693. For an English translation see (1969) 4 Israel.L.Rev. 559.
33 Which were to be held in the same year (Elections to the Knesset and Local Authorities
in the year 5730 (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Auditing) Law, 5729-1969.
34 1958 12 L.S.I. 85 (1958) (emphasis added).
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section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.
Mr. Bergman also contended that the new finance law had not received a
majority of the votes in the Knesset and therefore was illegal. The Supreme
Court upheld the claim of Mr. Bergman, thus exercising judicial review of
legislation which is not consistent with the entrenched section of Basic Law: The
Knesset.
The decision of the Supreme Court paved the way for other similar decisions
which followed35- most of which dealt with section 4 of Basic Law·: The
Knesset.
The results of the Bergman case were threefold. First, it had established, as
mentioned, the judicial review of statutes within the context of a contradiction
between statutes and entrenched sections of Basic Laws. Secondly, it had
qualified the doctrine of the supremacy of the Knesset. It'was clear after the
Bergman case that the Knesset can bind itself. Thirdly, due to the results of the
Bergman case the government had approved the drafts of two Basic Laws which,
if enacted, would formally make all Basic Laws superior to all other legislation.36
These Basic Laws are: Basic Law: Legislation 37 and Basic Law: The Courts. 38
The soft legal principles which were the outcome of Ko/ Ha 'am could be seen
as "islands" of a written constitution within a system without such a constitution.
The entrenched provisions of the various Basic Laws and the effect of Bergman,
constitute such "islands" which are not as "soft" as the previous ones.
On 3rd.March, 1992 a "continent," rather than an "island" emerged. That
"continent" was Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The purpose of this Basic
Law is to ensure that the freedom of occupation of every citizen or inhabitant of
the state will not be restricted, unless for a worthy purpose and to the benefit of
35 E.g. H.C. 246/81 Derech Eretz v.Broadcasting Authority (1981) 35(4) P.D.l.
36 At the present time they are still not enacted.
37 Section 11 of the draft reads: "A law which amends a Basic Law, whether expressly or
by implication, or which contradicts the provisions of the Basic Law, is adopted when a majority
of the members of the Knesset votes in its favour at the final reading, unless there is a contrary
provision in this regard contained in a Basic Law." Section 12(a) reads: "No objections shall be
raised with regard to the validity of a law except where such an objection claims that the law
amends a Basic Law, or that the recorded number of Knesset Members voting in its favour did
not constitute an adequate majority."
38 Section 15(a) of the draft reads: "The Supreme Court, sitting as the Constitutional
Court, will consider objections claiming that a law amending a Basic Law, did not receive the
required majority; the procedure will be set out in the Civil Procedure Rules."
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the majority. The section which is the most relevant to this discussion, and which
has made the greatest contribution to the development of the Israeli Constitution
is section 5 of the Basic Law which reads: "This Basic Law may not be changed
except by a Basic Law enacted by a majority of the Members of the Knesset.,,39
The contribution of this section to the development of the Constitution is
twofold. First, it does not entrench either a single or a number of provisions of a
Basic Law as does section 4 or 44 of Basic Law: The Knesset. Section 5 of
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation entrenches the whole of this Basic Law.
This actually grants this Basic Law a status of a semi-formal constitution. Due to
the Bergman precedent, any other legislation which is in either express or
implied contradiction with this Basic Law, will be subjected to judicial review.
However, it is a status of a semi-formal constitution because contradicting
subsequent legislation will be subjected to judicial review only within the
context of the manner in which it was enacted. There is no provision for judicial
review of such legislation purely on the basis of a substantive contradiction with
the Basic Law.
Secondly, unlike other types of entrenchment of provisions of Basic Laws, this
entrenchment is not made by requiring a special majority but rather by requiring
the enactment of another Basic Law. This method of entrenchment is even more
rigid than any requirement of a special majority. However, the effect of this
Basic Law as well as the content of another Basic Law, namely, Basic Law:.
Human Dignity and Liberty, were significantly diminished by political influence,
mainly the political interest of the religious parties.
IV. An Emerging Bill of Rights?
Until 1992, none of the Basic Laws dealt with fundamental human rights. The
reason for this is the opposition ofthe religious parties to a Bill of Rights (this
was also the primary objection to the adoption of a written constitution). The
religious parties oppose a Bill of Rights because it will entail judicial review of
statutes which were enacted due to the Parliamentary power of the religious
parties. A significant portion of these statutes are inconsistent with fundamental
freedoms and rights, due to their religious nature. Thus, should judicial review
be exercised over them, they might be rendered illegal.
In 1992, two Basic Laws concerning fundamental rights were enacted: Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. With
regard to these two Basic Laws, two points should be especially noted. The first
39 Translation by the authors.
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is that the content of the latter and the entrenchment of both the Basic Laws,
were significantly influenced by political interests. The second is that the effect
of these political interests was balanced by the judicial activism of the Supreme
Court of Israel.
As mentioned above the first version of the Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, was entrenched as a whole. This was because it was assumed that
the issues with which this Basic Law deals were not controversial within the
religious-secular debate. It was not too long before it became apparent that the
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation does have an affect over religious oriented
laws.
illMeatrael Ltd. v. Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 40 the Supreme Court
decided that restrictions on meat importations on the basis that the meat does not
comply with dietary religious (Kosher) Jewish laws, 41 were in violation of Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation.
The judgement sparked a political debate which resulted in a political deal
under which the Basic Law is to be re-enacted. Section 8 of the new version of
the Basic Law retains the power of the Knesset to enact laws contrary to Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation provided that it was enacted by an absolute
majority, and secondly, that it is expressly stated that it is enacted
notwithstanding the rights protected by the Basic Law. A statute enacted by
virtue of this overriding clause shall automatically expire four years after it came
into force.42 Once this overriding clause was introduced into the new Basic Law,
the Knesset enacted the Import of Frozen Meat Law 1994 which prohibits the
import of non-kosher meat into Israel.
The religious-secular debate is probably the reason for the lack of
entrenchment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. As this Basic Law was
clearly concerned with more controversial issues, it was not entrenched as a
whole as was Basic Law: Freedom of Occup:ltion. Moreover, the rights
protected by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are far from similar to
parallel provisions in other human rights declarations and treaties, such as the
European Convention of Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The fundamental rights which the Basic Law includes are: the right to life,
body, dignity, property, liberty of the individual, the right to leave and enter the
40 H.C. 5871/92 (1993) 47(1) P.D.52!.
41 These were mainly against the importation of pork.
42 This is similar to s.33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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country, and the right to privacy and personal confidentiality. It is evident that
fundamental rights such as freedom of religion and sexual equality were not
protected by the Basic Law due to political pressure exerted by the religious
parties.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in taking an active stance, mitigated both the
lack of entrenchment and the lack of protection of such rights. The lack of
protection of various fundamental rights by the Basic Law was remedied in E1-AI
Air Lines v. Danilewitz.43 This was done by including under the general term
"Human Dignity" rights such as equality and freedom of expression. Thus, the
Supreme Court held that benefits to which spouses of El-Al employees are
entitled should also be given to the homosexual partner of an El-Al air attendant.
The lack of entrenchment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was
remedied by a bench of nine judges in late 1995. In United Kizrachi Bank Ltd. v.
Migdal Co.Gp. Village most of the judges dealt with this question directly. 44 The
majority held that both Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation have the status of a fonnal constitution and are,
therefore, superior to ordinary legislation. As a result, the courts have the power
to review such legislation and to detennine whether it is illegal on the basis that
it is inconsistent with the Basic Laws.
The effect of this judgement is that all Basic Laws seem to enjoy the status of a
formal constitution, irrespective of whether they are entrenched in whole or in
part. This is a very dramatic decision, because the Knesset never expressly stated
that the Basic Laws ought to have such a status at this stage in the development
of the Israeli Constitution.
At the present time this is the current status of the emerging Israeli
constitution. In addition to the aforementioned Basic Laws, the following Basic
Laws have been enacted: Basic Law: Israel Lands 1960; Basic Law: The
President of the State 1964; Basic Law: The Government 1968; Basic Law: the
State Economy 1975; Basic Law: The Anny 1976; Basic Law: Jerusalem,
Capital of Israel, 1980; Basic Law: Judicature 1984; and Basic Law: The State
Comptroller 1988.
One can humbly predict that two factors will contribute to the further
development of the Israeli Constitution. The first is the enactment of the drafts of
Basic Law: Legislation, and Basic Law: The Courts. Such an enactment will
actually be the establishment of the fonnal constitution of the State of Israel. The
43 H.C. 1107/94 (1994) not yet reported.
44 C.A.6821/93 (1995) 49(4) P.D.22!.
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second factor is not as dramatic as the first one but not less significant. It is the
recent appointment of Justice Barak, a man known for his activist approach, to
the position of the President of the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice.
V. Conclusion
In summary, the State of Israel was envisaged as a democratic state with a
written constitution. This is apparent from the Declaration of the Establishment
of the State of Israel. However, due to political reasons, the formation of such a
constitution was postponed indefinitely. Instead, a compromise between those
who favour and those who oppose a written constitution was reached. Under the
famous Harrari resolution, the constitution was to be adopted in a piecemeal
fashion. Each "chapter" of the constitution dealt with different aspects of the
constitutional order of the state. Before the enactment of any such chapters, the
Supreme Court had demonstrated that it would enforce constitutional values,
even in the absence of a written constitution, or part thereof.
Once Basic Laws were enacted, their constitutional status was left uncertain.
Some were entrenched in part, and others were entrenched as a whole. The
content, as well as the degree of entrenchment of these Basic Laws, were
significantly influenced by the religious - secular debate which has been going
on in Israel since the very first day of its existence. What seems to be balancing
these effects is the activist approach of the Israeli Supreme Court which recently
stated that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty have the status of a formal constitution and therefore renders
subsequent legislation susceptible to judicial review.
What remains to be seen is whether this activist approach will be applied to
other Basic Laws, and whether the Knesset will take the necessary steps for
creating a written constitution in Israel. Namely the enactment of Basic Law:
Legislation, and Basic Law: The Courts.
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